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Inventory Reduction and Productivity Growth:
A Comparison of Japanese and US Automotive Sectors
ABSTRACT
This study assesses the inventory and productivity performance of the Japanese
and US automotive industries in recent decades.  Within each country we distinguish
between vehicle assemblers and parts suppliers.  In Japan, assemblers and suppliers made
dramatic inventory reductions and productivity gains, particularly during the 1970s.  By
comparison, we find an unbalanced pattern for the United States:  American assembly
plants have been streamlined, but parts suppliers have stagnated.  In both countries our
findings suggest a strong association between inventory reduction and productivity
growth.
2I.  Introduction
In recent decades the automotive industries of Japan and the United States have
experienced dramatic transformations.  One major development has been the adoption of
a set of process innovations commonly known as “just-in time” (JIT) manufacturing.
Pioneered by Toyota in the late 1950s, JIT methods were widely implemented in Japan
starting in the late 1960s, making their way to North America about a decade later (Im
and Lee, 1989; Nakamura et al., 1994).
A central feature of JIT is the ability to operate with minimal levels of inventory.
Inventory reduction exposes defects in the manufacturing process, forcing managers and
workers to eliminate sources of variability and waste (Schonberger, 1982).  Operations
managers commonly view inventor y levels as indicator s of pr oces s capability and ef f iciency.
A n analys is of J apanes e auto ass embler s and s upplier s ( Lieber man and D emees ter , 1995) 
s hows that inventor y r eductions w er e f ollow ed by s ignif icant gains in pr oductivity, w ith an
average l ag of about one year .  Thus , inventor y levels are important indicator s of 
manuf actur ing perf or mance.
Concurrent with the diffusion of JIT, various researchers have drawn productivity
comparisons between the Japanese and US automotive industries.1  Most studies have
concluded that Japanese producers attained a significant productivity advantage over
North American automakers by the early 1980s, with the gap subsequently narrowing.
Other work has documented the close links between vehicle assemblers and parts
suppliers in Japan, identifying these as a key factor in Japan’s success.2
This paper compares the Japanese and US automotive industries in recent decades, with
specific focus on relative inventory levels and rates of productivity growth.  We use
available data from national censuses and company financial reports to compute
3benchmark measures of inventory and productivity.  Within each country, we distinguish
between the auto assemblers and their component suppliers.  Prior comparisons of the
Japanese and US automotive industries have tended to emphasize the assemblers, often
ignoring the larger parts supply sector.3  Our analysis reveals radical differences in
performance between suppliers and assemblers in the United States.  This contrasts with
the situation in Japan, where the two groups have improved in parallel.
In particular, we show that Japanese automotive suppliers and assemblers have made
remarkably similar progress over a long period of time, whereas US suppliers and
assemblers have not.  The evidence suggests that in recent years the American assemblers
(with the possible exception of General Motors) have made substantial gains, reaching
parity with average Japanese levels of inventory and productivity.  Typical US suppliers,
though, have stagnated.  This disparity in performance within the US automotive sector
has many possible explanations, but it highlights the relative success of the Japanese
companies in coordinating and improving operations along the entire production supply
chain.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the types of
inventories within the automotive supply chain, and how they are related to the time
required for materials flow and processing.  Section 3 utilizes Census data to compare the
magnitude of inventories in Japan and the US.  It begins with an assessment of the total
inventories within the automotive supply chain, which are then disaggregated into two
components: (1) inter-firm inventories, and (2) work-in-process held internally by parts
suppliers and assemblers.  Section 4 compares the productivity growth of Japanese and
US assemblers and suppliers, based on data from Census and company financial reports.
Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary of the findings and discussion of their
implications.4
42.  Inventories within the Automotive Supply Chain
To achieve JIT production, inventories must be reduced to minimal levels.  In the
automotive supply chain, the relevant inventories are (1) work-in-process (WIP) held
internally by parts suppliers and vehicle assemblers, and (2) buffer inventories between
firms.  The latter can be divided into finished goods (FG) held by the upstream supplier,
and raw materials (RM) held by the downstream customer.  The amount of time required
to convert basic materials into finished products depends directly on the magnitude of
these inventories.
Figure 1 is a diagram which represents the inventories in a simplified automotive supply
chain.  A final assembler at the end of the chain obtains parts from two suppliers (S2 and
S2*), each of which has an additional upstream supplier (S1 and S1*).  To facilitate
comparison, assume that the two sets of suppliers provide identical components to the
assembler.  The vertical axis of the diagram represents the accumulation of product value;
the horizontal axis represents elapsed time.  Inventory stocks, by definition, are
proportional to areas under the graph.  Trapezoidal areas correspond to work-in-process
inventories.  (The slope rises as products accumulate value during processing.)
Rectangular areas correspond to inter-firm inventories (finished goods and raw
materials).
The diagram suggests how inventory levels are related to the speed of materials flow.
The two sets of suppliers in Figure 1 differ drastically in their inventory levels.  The
supplier pair, S1/S2, suffers from long processing times, leading to high levels of WIP
inventory.  Moreover, these firms hold substantial stocks of raw materials and finished
goods, which may be needed as a buffer if process breakdowns or other problems occur
frequently.  By comparison, the S1*/S2* supplier pair produces an identical product in a
much shorter period of time.  By eliminating sources of production variability and delay,
this supplier pair is able to operate with substantially less inventory.  As drawn in Figure
1, the total “cycle time” (measured from the receipt of materials by the upstream supplier,
5to completion of the vehicle by the assembler) equals T for the first set of suppliers, but
only T* for the second.  In general, for a given volume of output, the amount of inventory
in the supply chain rises in proportion to the cycle time.
3.  Inventory Analysis
Our analysis of automotive supply chain inventories is based on annual data from the
Census of Manufactures (Kogyo Tokei-hyo) of Japan, and the US Annual Survey of
Manufactures.5   We define total supply chain inventories as the sum of raw materials
(RM), work-in-process (WIP), and finished goods (FG) held by parts suppliers, plus raw
materials and work-in-process held by automotive assemblers.  We exclude inventories of
finished automobiles.
The Japanese and US Censuses subdivide the assembler and supplier categories,
respectively.  In Japan, where automotive assembly is often subcontracted, separate
figures are reported for “contract” and “core” assemblers.  (Core assemblers have their
own design capability and market under their own name.6)  The US Census provides
separate classifications for “motor vehicle parts and accessories” (SIC 3714) and
“automotive stampings” (SIC 3465), as well as several minor parts categories.7  In both
countries, the Census figures are aggregated from information collected from individual
manufacturing plants.  Thus, the parts supply operations of the US “Big-3” automakers
are incorporated in the Census classifications for automotive components.  We limit our
definition of the supply chain to categories that can be clearly identified as automotive
parts, sold primarily as original equipment rather than aftermarket replacement.8
Our analysis covers the period from 1967 through 1993.  The start date is motivated by
the fact that the US Annual Survey of Manufactures did not break out separate inventory
data on auto suppliers and assemblers until 1967.  Moreover, the late 1960s marked the
initial spread of JIT methods in Japan (Lieberman, Demeester and Rivas, 1995).
63.1.  Total Supply Chain Inventories
Figure 2 is a graph that compares the total inventories in the automotive supply chain in
Japan and the US from 1967 to 1993.  Total inventories were obtained by summing the
inventories held by parts suppliers (RM+WIP+FG) and vehicle assemblers (RM+WIP),
and dividing by the assemblers’ annual sales.  Table 1 reports numerical results of these
calculations with data averaged over the initial four years (1967-1970) and the final four
years (1990-1993) of the sample.
Supply chain inventories have been declining significantly in both Japan and the United
States.  Important differences are nevertheless apparent.  Table 1 shows that in the late
1960s, total supply chain inventories (per unit of final sales) were about 50% larger in the
US than in Japan.  Over the next two decades these inventories fell by 44% in Japan, but
only 34% in the US.  Thus, by the early 1990s the automotive supply chain in the US
held nearly twice as much inventory as in Japan.9
Figure 2 reveals some additional features when inventory changes are viewed over
shorter periods.  During the 1970s, when JIT became widely adopted in Japan, the
inventory differential between Japan and the US reached its widest point.  The gap has
since narrowed, as JIT met with diminishing returns in Japan while being increasingly
implemented in the US.  Both countries have seen cyclical fluctuation in inventories,
stemming from oil shocks (in late 1973 and 1979) and other business cycle effects.
The supply chain inventories illustrated in Figure 2 can be subdivided into:  (1) inter-firm
buffers, consisting of raw materials and finished goods, and (2) internal work-in-process
inventories needed to accommodate variability and delay in manufacturing processes.10
Below, we examine these two types of inventories in greater detail.
73.2.  Inter-firm Inventory
Figures 3a and 3b show the magnitude of inter-firm inventories in Japan and the US,
measured as a proportion of assemblers’ final sales.  Comparison of Figure 3a with
Figure 2 reveals that in Japan, the total supply chain inventory has been split fairly evenly
between work-in-process and inter-firm inventories.  The latter have been held mostly by
suppliers.  From the late 1960s through the early 1990s, Japanese suppliers cut these
inventories by 32% (RM) and 40% (FG).  Inventories rose slightly in the late 1980s to
accommodate a trend by Japanese assemblers toward greater product variety.
Interestingly, the largest percentage reductions were made by the contract assemblers,
who cut their raw materials stocks by more than 71% (as compared with a 45% reduction
by the core assemblers).  The contract assemblers typically produce relatively low-
volume vehicles, which tend to require more inventory per unit of sales.  The inventories
of contract assemblers were extremely high relative to sales in the 1960s.  Since then,
substantial improvements in their manufacturing operations have enabled major
inventory cuts.  For example, Kanto Auto Works, a Toyota contract assembler and early
adopter of JIT, reduced its raw materials inventory from more than 1.2% of sales in 1967
to less than 0.3% of sales by 1991.
Figure 3b shows that inter-firm inventories have been relatively high in the US---
typically more than twice the level of Japan.  This is due, in part, to greater physical
distance between plants in the US, leading t o gr eater variability in the timing of par ts 
deliver ies .11  M or eover , s tor age cos ts  ar e low er in the US , g iven cheaper land pr ices and
f ew er  s pace cons tr aints .  N evertheless , much of the dif f er ential may be attr ibuted to the mor e
limited adoption of  J I T.  I n the U S fr om the late 1960s thr ough the early 1990s , inter - f ir m
inventor ies f ell by 21% , or half the r ate of J apan.  This r eduction w as due entir ely to cuts made
by the U S as s embler s in their raw mater ials holdings dur ing the 1980s .  I n the late 1960s the
as s embler s ’ s tocks of r aw materials wer e more than tw ice as lar ge as the s upplier s ’ s tocks of 
f inis hed goods .  By the ear ly 1990s , how ever, thes e s upplier and as s embler inventor ies w er e
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inventor y o f their s upplier s actually incr eas ed ( Table 1).  Compar is on betw een countr ies 
s hows t hat J apanes e suppliers held more finished goods inventory than their US
counterparts in the 1960s, but less by the 1980s.
These statistics must be interpreted with caution, as it may be arbitrary whether suppliers
or assemblers hold title to the inventories which serve as a buffer between their
manufacturing operations.  Indeed, the US assemblers have always owned a much larger
proportion of these inventories than has been typical in Japan.  Nevertheless, the data
imply that in the US, efforts to cut inter-firm inventories have been initiated by the
assemblers.  What remains unclear is whether (a) suppliers have failed to fully adopt JIT
methods, or (b) the burden of inventory-holding has simply been shifted back on the
suppliers.  We suspect that both apply, although the extent varies from case to case.
3.3. Work-In-Process Inventory
Figure 4 compares the levels of work-in-process inventory for parts suppliers in Japan
and the US over the period from 1967 to 1993.  These levels were computed as the ratio:
[total supplier WIP/ total supplier sales].12  This WIP/sales ratio may be considered as an
approximate measure of average production cycle time (Lieberman, Demeester and
Rivas, 1995).
Since the 1960s, Japanese and US parts suppliers have made significant WIP reductions.
There are, however, important differences between the two countries.  The Japanese
suppliers made fairly steady improvements from the 1960s through the late 1980s, when
increases in product variety led to an incremental rise in inventory.  In the US, by
contrast, parts makers achieved significant inventory reductions in the early 1980s but
subsequently reached a plateau.  US parts suppliers currently hold nearly twice as much
WIP per unit of sales as their counterparts in Japan.
9Figure 5 focuses on work-in-process inventory held by the automotive assemblers.  It
plots the ratio:  [total assembler WIP/ total assembler sales].  Comparison of the US
automotive companies with the core assemblers in Japan shows that both groups held
comparable amounts of WIP inventory in the early 1970s.  In the mid-1970s the Japanese
made dramatic reductions and began to lead the US firms by a considerable margin.  By
the 1990s, however, the US assemblers had caught up and possibly even pulled ahead,
holding less WIP inventory, as a fraction of sales, than their counterparts in Japan.
Viewed over the entire 1967-1993 period, the data show that the US assemblers cut their
WIP inventory more gradually than the Japanese but have made similar progress overall.
Thus, the US and Japanese assemblers have made substantial WIP reductions, which
presumably reflect underlying improvements in their manufacturing operations.  In
making international comparisons between assemblers, however, a number of issues must
be considered.  One is product variety: within a given plant, greater variety normally
leads to higher requirements for WIP inventory.  This is confirmed by the difference
between core and contract assemblers in Japan.  The contract assemblers produce a more
diverse array of lower-volume vehicles and have historically held significantly greater
amounts of WIP.  Compared with both types of assemblers in Japan, the US assemblers
generally operate more dedicated plants, with less product variety.  This would, other
things equal, give rise to lower WIP inventory requirements.  Thus, the low WIP of US
assemblers may be partly attributable to the more homogeneous product mix of US
assembly plants.13
4.  Comparative Productivity
We now turn to the productivity performance of automotive suppliers and assemblers in
Japan and the United States.  If inventory reductions are linked to productivity growth,
the inventory patterns documented above should be accompanied by changes in
productivity.  In particular, substantial productivity growth should be observed for
assemblers and suppliers in Japan through the mid-1980s.  In the US, we would expect to
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see sizable productivity growth for assemblers in recent years, but less growth for
suppliers.
Our objective is not to present detailed productivity computations, but rather to assess the
general trends of productivity change since the 1960s for suppliers and assemblers in the
two countries.  We begin with such an assessment in Japan, followed by the United
States.
4.1.  Labor Productivity: Japan
Figure 6a plots the labor productivity of Japanese parts suppliers and core assemblers
from 1967 to 1993.14  Table 2 reports average growth rates of labor productivity during
the first and second half of this period.  Labor productivity is defined as value-added per
employee in constant yen.15  Estimates have been derived from two alternative sources:
(1) the Census of Manufacturing, and (2) company annual financial reports.16
As shown in Figure 6a, the estimated levels of labor productivity differ between the
Census and annual report data, particularly for the assemblers.  The main reason for this
disparity is that the Census data omit employees located in auxiliary units (headquarters
and support facilities), whose value-added is included in the manufacturing plant totals.
Labor productivity estimates derived from the Census data are therefore biased upward.
Comparable estimates from company reports have other drawbacks:  they cover only a
sample of larger firms, and they include diversified activities.  Fortunately, the growth
rates of labor productivity are similar for the two sets of data (Table 2).
Ignoring biases in estimated productivity levels, the Japanese data show a strong general
pattern:  the productivity of both suppliers and assemblers grew rapidly from the late
1960s through the late 1980s.  As would be expected, there was some slowing of growth
in percentage terms.  Based on the Census data, prior to 1980 the labor productivity of
parts suppliers rose at an average annual rate of 11.4%, falling to 4.3% for the subsequent
period.  Core assemblers’ productivity rose by 7.9% per annum prior to 1980, slowing to
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4.0% thereafter.  These figures reveal that parts suppliers enjoyed faster labor
productivity growth than assemblers in Japan.  The average labor productivity level of
suppliers was roughly half that of the assemblers in the mid-1960s, but the difference had
virtually disappeared by the 1990s.
4.2.  Labor Productivity: US
The pattern of productivity growth in the US auto industry since the 1960s has been quite
different from that observed in Japan.  Figure 6b plots labor productivity levels for the
US companies (value-added per employee, in constant dollars17) from 1967 to 1993.
Estimates are derived from Census data for automotive stampings plants, other parts
plants, and assembly plants.  We also include estimates developed from financial reports
covering each of the Big 3 assemblers.  A comparable sample could not be constructed
from annual reports for US parts suppliers, as financial statements in the US typically do
not provide sufficient information to allow value-added to be estimated.18
The data show a pattern of productivity divergence between US assemblers and their
suppliers.  The assemblers have experienced significant productivity growth, particularly
since the early 1980s.19  Within the Big 3, however, differences are apparent, with GM
failing to share in the productivity gains enjoyed by Ford and Chrysler in recent years.
Post-1980 productivity growth rates ranged from 4.0% per year at GM, to 8.9% at Ford,
based on data from annual reports.  GM’s poor performance may be partly attributable to
the company’s heavy involvement in parts-making operations, which cannot be
distinguished from assembly operations in the annual reports.20  Indeed, the Census data,
which are specific to US assembly plants, show a 1980-1993 productivity growth rate of
8.8% for these plants, close to the rate estimated from the annual reports for Ford.  We
suspect, however, that the Census rate may be biased upward by an increasing fraction of
Big-3 employment assigned to auxiliary units (design, R&D, and administration) located
outside of manufacturing plants.
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The productivity trends for US automotive suppliers have been very different from those
shown for the assemblers.  Since the 1960s, supplier productivity has been stagnant.21
Table 2 shows that average labor productivity growth of suppliers was 1.1% per year
from 1967 to 1980, rising to 2.6% (automotive parts) and 3.7% (stampings) from 1980 to
1993.  These figures fall below those of the assemblers, particularly in the later period.
On the positive side, most of the automotive supplier productivity growth was recorded
over the period from 1991 to 1993, so it is possible that this recent upward trend will
continue.
Comparison between countries shows that since the early 1980s, the US auto assemblers
have enjoyed higher labor productivity growth than their Japanese counterparts,
suggesting a pattern of productivity convergence.  US parts suppliers, though, appear to
have been falling behind.  The labor productivity growth of US suppliers has lagged
behind that of suppliers in Japan and assemblers in both countries.22  These patterns of
productivity growth tend to mirror the rates of inventory reduction described earlier.
4.3.  Total Factor Productivity: US
Labor productivity denotes utilization of a single input and hence provides only a partial
index of manufacturing efficiency.  Total factor productivity (TFP), which attempts to
measure the change in output net of the changes in all inputs, is commonly regarded as a
more appropriate measure of productivity.  Table 2 presents estimates of growth in TFP,
taken from the NBER database covering US manufacturing industries through 1991
(Bartelesman and Gray, 1994).  These TFP figures represent the annual growth in output,
net of changes in various types of inputs: labor, capital, energy and materials.
Table 2 shows that since the 1960s, TFP for the US assemblers has grown at a
respectable rate averaging about 1.7% per year.  For the US suppliers, though, TFP
growth has been negative.  Thus, the pattern indicated by TFP is similar to that shown for
labor productivity:  substantial growth by US assemblers, but mediocre performance on
average by suppliers.  Unfortunately, we do not have comparable data on Japanese TFP.23
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5. Conclusions
This study has presented measures of inventory and productivity in the Japanese and US
automotive industries, distinguishing the performance of parts suppliers from that of
vehicle assemblers.  The measures reveal radical differences in performance between
suppliers and assemblers in the United States.  Since the 1980s, the US auto assemblers
have made drastic cuts in inventory and have enjoyed rapid productivity growth, whereas
US parts suppliers have stagnated along both dimensions.  In Japan, by contrast,
assemblers and suppliers have long made steady, parallel improvements in their
manufacturing operations.
Recent studies have described the successful adoption of Japanese manufacturing
methods by US vehicle assemblers (MacDuffie and Pil, 1995), as compared with the slow
convergence of parts suppliers in the two countries (McMillan, 1990; Cusumano and
Takeishi, 1991; Helper, 1991; Asanuma, 1992; Helper and Sako, 1995).  Our findings
clarify these trends as reflected by firms’ inventory levels.  We have also shown that
productivity growth and inventory reduction have tended to coincide for broad classes of
suppliers and assemblers in Japan and the United States.
Our most striking findings relate to the poor performance of American automotive
suppliers.  While these findings could, conceivably, be due to errors of measurement, the
broad pattern is consistent with evidence from other sources.  Prior studies have pointed
to a failure of incentives and institutions in the automotive supply chain of the United
States.24  Compared with Japan, US supplier-assembler relations have long been
characterized by mistrust and adversarial relations.  This environment has limited the
extent of information sharing and collaborative, long term investments.  Moreover, the
US has lacked Japanese-style “supplier associations” to promote dissemination of best-
practice manufacturing methods.  This situation may, however, be transient:  the
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productivity data suggest strong improvements by US suppliers beginning in the 1990s,
so it is possible that catch-up by US suppliers, while belated, is now starting to occur.
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1 See, for example, Cusumano (1985), Womak, Jones and Roos (1990), Lieberman, Lau and Williams
(1990), Fuss and Waverman (1992), Fujimoto and Takeishi (1995), McDuffie and Pil (1995).
2 Representative studies include Asanuma (1985, 1989), Smitka (1991), Nishiguchi (1994), Fruin and
Nishiguchi (1994), Sako (1996) and Dyer (1996a, 1996b).
3 Parts plants account for 74% of total automotive employment in Japan and 65% in the United States,
based on estimates for 1990 by McKinsey Global Institute (1993).
4 This paper is part of a broader investigation of the automotive supply chain in Japan and the United
States.  Li eberm an,  Dem eest er and Ri vas (1995) pres ent s hi s tori cal dat a on the proces s of invent ory
reduct i on by speci fi c Japanes e com pani es .  Us i ng thes e dat a, Lieberman and Demeester (1995) apply
statistical methods to characterize the link between work-in-process inventory reduct i ons and
product i vi ty gai ns .  A thi rd study, Li eberm an, Hel per and Dem eest er (1996), us es survey inform at ion on
North Am erican part s suppl i ers t o as ses s the det ermi nant s of invent ory l evel s in manufact uri ng plant s . 
5 In related studies we use data from company annual financial reports.  The Census data have the
advantage that they cover the entire industry, rather than a sample of firms.  Moreover, the Census data
are collected at the level of individual manufacturing plants, which avoids problems relating to
companies’ diversification and vertical integration.  (For example, the major auto assemblers are
typically integrated into parts manufacturing, with some international operations and diversification
outside the automotive sector.)  Thus, the Census data allow for more comprehensive analysis of the
entire automotive supply chain within a given country and a more precise measure of how inventories
are divided between parts and assembly plants.  A comparison of supplier inventory ratios computed
from the two data sources is provided in Lieberman, Helper and Demeester (1996, Table 2).  The
corresponding ratios are nearly identical, except in the category of finished goods where they appear
larger using the annual report data which include warehouse inventories held remotely from
manufacturing plants.
6 The term “core assembler” is from Asanuma (1989).
7 The minor categories, which are excluded from our analysis, are “carburetors, pistons, rings and valves”
(SIC 3592), “engine electrical equipment” (SIC 3694), “motor vehicle hardware” (SIC 34296) and
“automotive screw machine products” (SIC 34511).  The first two categories include a sizable
proportion of aircraft and truck parts.  The latter two categories are defined at the five-digit SIC level,
for which inventory data are unavailable.  In 1993, these four categories had a total value of shipments
of $13 billion, as compared with $85 billion for SIC 3714 and $18 billion for SIC 3465.  Omission of
the minor parts categories leads to an underestimate of about 10% in our figures for total US supply
chain inventories.
8 Thus, we exclude tire, battery and glass producers, important categories of suppliers that sell to the
assemblers directly.  A comprehensively-defined supply chain would encompass a broad range of
19
                                                                                                                                                
upstream operations such as mining, steelmaking, chemical processing, etc., which are also omitted
here.
9 Nakamura and Nakamura (1989) report similar findings for other manufacturing industries, indicating that
Japanese firms tend to have lower desired inventory/sales ratios and higher speeds of adjustment than
US firms.
10 See Lieberman, Helper and Demeester (1996) for an extended discussion of the functions of automotive
inventories.
11 In 1989, the average frequency of parts delivery was every six days in the US, as compared with less than
one day in Japan.  By 1993 the US delivery frequency had fallen below four days.  The US trend toward
small lot deliveries has, however, been offset by increased supplier stockpiling of finished goods
(Helper and Sako, 1995; Lieberman, Helper and Demeester, 1996).
12 The supply chain comparisons presented earlier use assembler sales as the denominator.
13 Another issue to be considered in making these comparisons is that there is considerable variation in the
WIP levels of specific producers and plants.  For example, Toyota and Honda lie substantially below
the Japanese industry averages shown in Table 1 and Figure 5 (Lieberman, Demeester and Rivas, 1995).
14 For simplification, the contract assemblers are excluded.
15 To adjust for inflation we used the wholesale price deflator for transport equipment published by the
Bank of Japan.
16 The annual report data cover eight core assemblers, three contract assemblers and 41 parts suppliers, as
described in Lieberman, Demeester and Rivas (1995).  The group averages shown in Table 2 and Figure
6 mask substantial heterogeneity among firms.  For example, Toyota’s labor productivity in the 1980s
was about 50% above the average of other Japanese assemblers
17 We used output price deflators for automotive parts (SIC 3714), stampings (SIC 3465) and assembly
(SIC 3711) from the NBER database developed by Bartlesman and Gray (1994).
18 The missing information typically pertains to employee compensation.
19 The 1980 sample midpoint tends to understate the early growth rates and overstate the later rates, as 1980
was a recession year.
20 GM is also the most internationally diversified of the US assemblers, which tends to reduce its average
labor productivity.
21 A detailed study using confidential, plant-level Census data (Herzenberg and Campbell, 1993) considers
potential data problems that might lead to an underestimate of automotive supplier productivity.  These
include the need to adjust for changes in capacity utilization, price-cost margins, product quality,
relative wages, environmental regulation, and output mix.  Herzenberg and Campbell conclude that
adjustment for these factors cannot account for the meager productivity growth shown by US
automotive suppliers.  Further, they find that captive suppliers had lower productivity growth than
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independents.  The tails of the productivity distribution became fatter between 1978 and 1988,
suggesting the coexistence of very high-performing and very-low performing plants.
22 This pattern of poor relative performance by US suppliers is corroborated by a recent study by McKinsey
Global Institute (1993).
23 Estimates of Japanese automotive TFP are available but without separate breakdown for suppliers and
assemblers.  Fuss and Waverman (1992) give TFP comparisons covering the Japanese and US
automotive sectors as a whole.  Lieberman, Lau and Williams (1990) compare labor productivity,
capital productivity and TFP for auto assemblers in the US and Japan.
24 Japan-US differences in supply chain incentives and organization are discussed at length by McMillian
(1990), Asanuma (1992), Sako (1996), and Dyer (1996a, 1996b).
Table 1.
Inventories in the Automotive Supply Chain
(as a proportion of final vehicle sales)
Japan: Average Average Percent
1967-70 1990-93 Change
Parts RM .012 .008 -32%
Suppliers WIP .019 .012 -38%
FG .015 .009 -40%
Total .045 .028 -37%
Contract RM .004 .001 -71%
Assemblers WIP .004 .002 -56%
Total .009 .003 -63%
Core RM .006 .003 -45%
Assemblers WIP .020 .010 -52%
Total .026 .013 -50%
Industry Inter-firm .036 .021 -42%
Total WIP .043 .023 -46%
Total .080 .044 -44%
United States: Average Average Percent
1967-70 1990-93 Change
Parts RM .019 .020 6%
Suppliers WIP .023 .016 -34%
FG .012 .013 9%
Total .054 .049 -11%
Stampings RM .006 .003 -51%
Suppliers WIP .005 .003 -30%
FG .001 .001 51%
Total .011 .007 -35%
RM .027 .014 -49%
Assemblers WIP .029 .011 -62%
Total .056 .025 -56%
Industry Inter-firm .064 .051 -21%
Total WIP .057 .030 -48%
Total .121 .081 -34%
Sources:  Annual Survey of Manufactures (US)
Census of Manufactures (Japan)
Table 2.
Productivity Growth of US and Japanese Parts Suppliers and Assemblers
Average Annual Growth Rate
1967-1980 1980-1993
Japan:
Parts LP(Census) 11.4% 4.3%
Suppliers LP(AR) 10.5% 3.6%
Contract LP(Census) 9.1% 3.3%
Assemblers LP(AR) 9.9% 3.6%
Core LP(Census) 7.9% 4.0%
Assemblers LP(AR) 7.8% 2.4%
United States:
Parts LP(Census) 1.1% 2.6%
Suppliers TFP -1.0% -0.3% *
Sampings LP(Census) 1.1% 3.7%
Suppliers TFP -0.2% 0.2% *
Assemblers LP(Census) 1.3% 8.8%
TFP 1.5% 1.8% *
    GM LP(AR) 1.2% 4.0%
    Ford LP(AR) 3.8% 8.9%
    Chrysler LP(AR) 2.7% 5.7%
*Calculations are for 1980-1991.
LP = labor productivity.
        (value-added per employee in constant currency)
TFP = total factor productivity
Census = Annual Survey of Manufactures (US)
               Census of Manufactures (Japan)
AR = Company Annual Reports 
         (Japan AR sample includes: 39 parts suppliers, 

















































Total Automotive Supply Chain Inventories: Japan vs. US
Sources:
     Annual Survey of Manufactures (US)
















































































































































Core Assemblers' Raw Materials
Contract Assemblers' Raw Materials
Suppliers' Finished Goods
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Source:  US Annual Survey of Manufactures
Figure 4.













































































































































































































































Figure 6a.  








































Figure 6b.  
Labor Productivity of US Parts Suppliers and Assemblers
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